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Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?
by Michael J. Zimmer*

T

Introduction

he international debate over reducing worldwide carbon
emissions increasingly focuses on effectively reducing
carbon emissions by formulating novel policy tools after
the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. One recommendation posits
that if a tax is levied on carbon emissions it would promote environmentally-minded business decisions, encourage incremental
investment in new clean technology, attract the necessary level
of capital formation in impacted sectors, and achieve national
and global environmental goals. Yet, to effectively reduce carbon emissions, businesses and individuals will have to adopt
significant lifestyle and behavioral changes and endorse choices
with dramatic economic consequences. Rather than dwelling on
the immediate impacts on business and household budgets, all
users of energy must eventually confront and assume responsibility for reducing the economic and environmental consequences of carbon emissions. Once governed under the law of
“commons,” carbon will now become governed by the laws of
science, physics, and economics in global markets. To this end,
the most effective plan will ensure that all sources of carbon are
meaningfully addressed.
If economic markets were forced to integrate the cost of
environmental externalities caused by carbon emissions into
the costs of doing business, the ensuing price signals and economic incentives would force a dramatic shift toward developing cleaner energy sources and more sustainable energy habits.
Economic consequences will likely be imposed on the industries
that created carbon emissions if there is any hope of effectively
reversing the legacy of environmental damage. This Article
argues that implementing a tax on carbon dioxide (“CO2”)
imposes economic accountability and would impact the use of
precious resources in a more direct, transparent, and sustainable
manner than any proposed cap-and-trade program. The critical
issue is managing the perceived political consequences of exercising such policy choices.
A carbon tax would directly influence both industry and
individual behavior with transparency, fairness, speed, and balance. Industry would have an economic incentive to reduce
their carbon emissions to avoid the tax, which would likely
be a cost passed on to consumers, and thus, the price signals
created would modify consumer behavior. Accurate price signals for carbon (with diminished volatility) will also direct the
marketplace so that clean renewable sources of power, energy
efficiency, demand-side management, and combined heat and
power technologies enjoy a level playing field with the CO2producing conventional fossil fuel generation resources. A capand-trade system will reward traders, commodities merchants,
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and financial institutions. An astute use of the federal tax system
can build companies, development of equipment and technology, and ensure that physical investments are made in sustainable business models.
But the question remains whether the carbon tax is ready
for widespread application in light of the clear impediments
to, and uncertainty about, a cap-and-trade system. Currently,
carbon trading cannot establish with reasonable accuracy how
much carbon is being bought and sold over a period of time.
The product is not physical, it is not readily usable, and the purchaser faces limited utility after the purchase is consummated. It
is also subject to a level of reliance on fiduciary conduct that has
been compromised in past decades and is not fully embedded
in all global financial and legal systems. Industry self-reporting
will remain an essential component to any new CO2 emissionscontrol system, but the most effective policies will institute a
further measure of verification and transparency. No technology
can confirm and validate such continuous emissions monitoring
for new CO2 products in support of a cap-and-trade system.

Carbon Tax Basics
A “carbon tax” is a tax on the carbon content of fuels; effectively, it is a tax on the CO2 emissions produced from burning
fossil fuels.1 The current prices of gasoline, electricity, oil, coal,
and other fuels do not include the full economic costs of the
health, resource, and environmental externalities associated with
the broad usage of these energy sources in the United States and
around the world. The failure to force industry and consumers to
shoulder these externalities suppresses the economic incentive
to develop and implement carbon-reducing measures like energy
efficiency, renewable energy, advanced metering, storage, additional transmission, or clean technology. On the other hand,
taxing fuels based on their carbon content infuses these incentives at every point in the chain of production and consumption,
from an individual’s choice of the type and usage of vehicles,
appliances, and housing, to business choices of product design,
capital investment, facilities location, and government’s choices
when setting regulatory policy direction.2

* Mr. Zimmer is an attorney at Thompson Hine LLP in the energy practice and
also serves this academic year with the Ohio University Consortium of Energy,
Economics and the Environment. Mr. Zimmer expresses his appreciation for the
assistance, research, and editorial guidance provided by Jennifer M. Rohleder in
the preparation of this article. Ms. Rohleder is a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law and a law clerk at Thompson Hine LLP in Washington, D.C. The
views herein are based on the author’s research and do not necessarily represent the views of any clients the author represents nor organizations in which the
author participates.
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Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade
Regardless of whether creating a price for carbon emissions takes the form of a tax or tradable emissions allowances,
the cost of carbon emissions will
be passed through to the ultimate
consumers. This fundamental
market result occurs while ninetyeight percent of United Kingdom
(“U.K.”) businesses recognize it
is important to reduce the environmental impact of industry.3
Over fifty percent of U.K. companies today are struggling with
long-term strategic and business
modeling decisions in the face
of the current unstable policy
and tax environment.4 Interestingly, after global cap-and-trade
emissions trading experience,
almost sixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of
the tax system to provide incentives for them to become carbon neutral.5 Only the public policy processes fail to recognize
this current market-based distinction in managing what has been
characterized as one of the greatest market failures in the world
today—that failure to clearly account for the externalities of fossil fuel use.

In addition, administering the carbon tax could utilize current tax collection mechanisms and existing enforcement, compliance, reporting, and administrative resources. In contrast,
the cap-and-trade approach
embraced by the financial
industry envisions creating a
complex new system for compliance reporting, audits, and
verification with an uncertain
value proposition in return.
Without developing rigorous
new accounting and verification mechanisms, such a system is unworkable and will
be highly volatile and subject
to gaming, thereby undermining confidence and certainty in
planning the outcome. A carbon
tax is much more feasible than
a cap-and-trade system, except for the threat of its dire political
consequences.

A carbon tax would
directly influence
both industry and
individual behavior with
transparency, fairness,
speed, and balance.

Price Predictability
A carbon tax sets a market clearing price that encourages
predictable energy prices. Predictability is important because
when future energy and power prices can be reliably calculated
in advance, energy-critical decisions can be made with the full
awareness of carbon price signals. Once these price signals are
added to the costs that industry must factor into the cost of doing
business, they can affect plant and building design considerations, new clean technology development, electricity storage
and deployment for industry, and appliance selection and the
purchase of the family car for the individual.6
The United States has had tradable permits for sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. In that period, the tradable permits have varied in
price by over forty percent.7 Yet due to carbon’s higher relative
market penetration within the United States and global economy,
compared to that of SO2, similar price fluctuations would likely
affect all aspects of the U.S. economy, including consumer
spending, budgeting, capital expansion, and inflation.8

Simple Administration
The carbon content of every form of fossil fuel is precisely known, as is the amount of CO2 released when that fuel
is burned.9 This precision presents few technical problems for
documentation or measurement. The type of fuel and the amount
purchased or used is already tracked by most industrial and private consumers. Thus, instituting a carbon tax would require
few, if any, additional reporting or accounting burdens, while
enjoying clarity and transparency.
Winter 2008

Timing
A carbon tax can be implemented much more quickly than
a cap-and-trade program. This factor is critical to the effectiveness of any CO2 emissions reduction policy because time is of
the essence from a scientific performance basis.10 So far, capand-trade has proven to be unsuccessful in reducing carbon
emissions in the European Union and other global markets.11
Although a cap-and-trade system has been extremely successful in the United States for reducing SO2 emissions in the past
decade, the SO2 model is not dispositive for carbon. A carbon
cap-and-trade program will have to be designed one hundred
times larger in scale than its SO2 counterpart, which creates an
enormous problem of scale, complexity, administration, and
cost of compliance for cross-border purposes. In a comparable
example, the success of the U.S. acid rain program required
solid data collection and transparent verification combined with
the use of continuous emissions monitoring technology. Readily available technology does not currently exist for filtering or
capturing CO2. Carbon storage or sequestration will likely take
another decade to become cost effective and will create operational de-rating of ten to thirty percent, water supply demands,
fuels shifting, and higher operating costs to succeed.
Cap-and-trade systems are also complex and difficult to
design. Issues concerning the proper level of the cap, timing,
allowance allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures,
standards for use of offsets, penalties and regional conflicts must
all be addressed before the system can be implemented.12 These
issues require complex operational and political considerations
that surely would hinder any timely solution to regulating U.S.
CO2 emissions. Further, while this design and implementation
process is taking place, polluters are free to continue unchecked
while uncertainty reigns for another decade. A cap-and-trade
approach for CO2 will not be as effective as a carbon tax in the
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short term because it will lag behind the needs of the marketplace, scientific inquiry, and global policy making. It would not
offer transparency, nor a clear stable price signal to support capital investment and new investment decision-making until 2020.

Less Fraud and Manipulation
The protracted negotiations necessary to develop a comprehensive and politically acceptable carbon cap-and-trade program
leave the process vulnerable to parties shaping the program to
maximize narrow economic benefits, maximizing their market
positions in industry sectors, or constraining competition rather
than designing an economically
efficient system that maximizes
public gain and a competitive
U.S. economy. In a cap-andtrade program, although market
prices will increase, just as with
a carbon tax, the reasons for the
increase are hidden in a maze
of new bureaucracy, regulatory
impositions, and cost partnerships that render it more opaque
and politically attractive.
A carbon tax can be implemented with far less opportunity for manipulation. Carbon taxes are transparent and easily
understandable by the public. Once the market targets for carbon
are set, they can be readily adjusted according to market success or failure. However, it is this transparency and flexibility
that makes a carbon tax politically undesirable because it is clear
where and how society will have to take responsibility, make
direct changes and improvements, and pay for the CO2 by-products of society.

tax,15 I argue it is more effective to skip the middleman with
its administrative costs and complexity, verification problems,
and lack of transparency in favor of a clear tax. To succeed, the
carbon tax would need to be coupled with other tax offsets in the
tax code to be revenue neutral, and be managed in trust to avoid
profligate political expenditures.

Economic Efficiency
Setting a clearing price for carbon that can be periodically evaluated for its effectiveness in achieving public policy
and market performance objectives is a simpler and more economically efficient approach
than a cap-and-trade program.
The cost of carbon can be set
through a tax mechanism, and
its progress in reducing energy
intensity can be evaluated every
five years. This built-in evaluation process permits adjustments to be made, which will
ensure achievement of emission reduction goals. Technical
inputs can be provided by DOE,
EPA, NOAA, and the National Academy of Science each cycle
for review with final economic evaluations of the tax conducted
by Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
In the United States, potential economic harm could be
diminished by offsetting the revenue resulting from a new carbon tax upon its enactment, with mirroring reductions in the
payroll tax, the corporate tax rate, and the alternative minimum
tax. Additional revenue can be reserved in trust for government
funding of clean energy technology and advanced energy R&D.
Economic feedback would be provided with balance to benefit the corporate, small business, and individual tax payers to
reduce the economic burden of the new carbon tax scheme by
starting with a tax that is “revenue neutral.” The key effectiveness of a carbon tax program that is currently being overlooked
is that such a tax may become revenue neutral. Revenue neutrality shifts the economic burden to industries requiring behavioral
and competitive modification consistent with global policy shifts
while preserving efficiency, energy intensity, and benefits of stability in the U.S. economy. No cap-and-trade proposal offers
similar revenue neutrality and the specter of economic stability.
Rather, cap-and-trade arguably creates some market winners,
many market or industry sector losers, opportunities for gaming,
and makes U.S. consumers the biggest losers of all.

A carbon tax can be
implemented much more
quickly than a
cap-and-trade program.

Cap-and-Trade is a Tax in Another Form
The key attribute of cap-and-trade that has made it so popular is that future emission targets for reductions are fixed and
known. This is mostly propaganda, however, because most capand-trade systems under development include a “safety-valve”
provision. This safety valve would counter the operations of
markets and provide for the auctioning of additional allowances
if the price exceeds a certain predetermined value.13 In addition,
the knowledge of the future trajectory of carbon emissions is
questionably valuable because there is no agreed-upon trajectory
for achieving climate stability and preventing disaster.14
Cap-and-trade programs have traditionally provided initial
allowances for free. Freely giving away financial assets prevents
the government from reducing the economic costs of carbon control by cutting taxes elsewhere, or by providing rebates to protected classes of consumers. Certain industries capitalize upon
the economic benefit and prioritize the costs in products regarding services, which flow generally to utilities and traditional
energy providers. Costs are passed through twice to consumers;
this was the case in European electricity markets following the
European Emissions Trading System. While the newer proposed
cap-and-trade programs include a government auction of permits to generate revenue and emulate the advantage of a carbon
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Issues in Designing the Carbon Tax
None of the current carbon tax discussions are ready for
implementation yet for several reasons:

1. Lack of Adequate Enforcement and
Strategy for Tax
Additional tax and energy specialists would need to
be shifted from the U.S. DOE and EPA to the U.S. Treasury
Department. Initially, additional staffing would be required for
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

the additional rulemaking, audits, enforcement, and advisory
work. Tax treaties and the World Trade Organization are in
place to administer international consequences. Within a decade,
administrative precedents could be established, and staffing
management would likely decline as the tax system is largely
self-implementing thereafter.

2. Ability to Ratchet
The whole reason for implementing a tax for carbon is to
harness economic power to quickly attack a serious environmental problem. The goal is to create a market for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to avoid the extraordinary costs
of climate change-induced adaptation. To ensure that emissions
reductions are actually occurring, rather than simply permitting
people to pay more in order to emit much like they are paying
more to continue to drive, a ratcheting mechanism can be studied. The ratchet would periodically increase the tax rate depending on the emission reductions achieved, evaluated every five
years through the processes shared above. This will provide a
consistent price signal to encourage development of less carbonintensive technologies, accelerate clean technology deployment
and planning certainty, and stimulate a societal behavioral shift
toward sustainable business and commercial practices to maintain U.S. competitiveness.
This ratcheting plan was introduced to the House of Representatives in April 2007 when Representative Stark (D-CA)
introduced a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to impose a tax on fossil fuels based on their carbon content.16
This structure could be adapted to begin at $10 per ton of carbon content and increased by $10 per ton every five years until
the United States reaches an annual emissions level that does
not exceed a specified level of CO2 emissions. This structure
would reward early company actions and establish an economic
benchmark, while recording market reaction and response and
managing price volatility.

3. Not as Workable for Transportation
and Commercial Buildings
The cap-and-trade system or carbon tax may not impact the
transportation and commercial building sectors as effectively
as the electric power production sector. More focus is provided
on stationary sources through cap-and-trade while mobile and
building sources are ignored. The new fuel efficiency standards
for passenger and non-passenger vehicles, however, will create
a more direct impact on the transportation sector. In addition,
green buildings could benefit from a required market evaluation
of energy efficiency improvements in building appraisals upon
sale or resale. Moreover, a cost of capital, insurance reductions
and resale valuation “adders” from LEED certified new or existing buildings could be implemented with clearer market signals.
Federal tax credits, accelerated depreciation, state building codes,
and state tax incentives could round out this market for construction where substantial CO2 savings are possible through funding
with carbon tax revenues. The new recognition of forestry and
agricultural impacts might also favor a tax solution to cut back
administrative costs in these important carbon markets.
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4. Requires an Overhaul of Energy
and Environmental Taxes in the Tax Code
Consistent with the enactment of a new carbon tax, existing tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code would require
review for consistency and “deadwood” overhaul. Legacy decisions of the past are not the building blocks of our national
future. The outdated or inconsistent provisions in the tax code
must be removed as part of a carbon tax enactment. A tax or
fee could be levied on CO2 emissions, which would establish
the costs of such emissions with clarity. The market can then
establish the emission level and degree of market penetration in
a revenue neutral environment engaging in classic tax planning
and capital investment in carbon tax avoidance strategies. This
fosters a more productive market transaction than the artificial
cap-and-trade scheme with uncertain prices, little transparency,
additionality and verification concerns—with no corresponding
guarantees of similar levels of capital support for investment in
physical assets to reduce carbon.

5. Problems with Social Stewardship
The neediest citizens of our country need a set-aside of
funds from any new tax revenues. This set-aside should be split
between improving multi-family housing stock upon audit and
Low Income Housing Energy Assistance Program fuel assistance, and affordable housing incentives, structures and support
administered through state, county, and city governments and
foundations. A cap-and-trade system offers no contribution to
our obligations for social stewardship.

6. Water Impact Analysis
No carbon strategy should be considered credible without
analyzing the water impact of the technology choices and strategies for the future. Specifically, the analysis should include the
technology’s impact on water resources, water availability, and
sustainability for CO2 purposes administered through EPA and
the Army Corps of Engineers.

Conclusion
A fair assessment of these strategy alternatives and implementation consequences is critical because the national choices
we make in managing carbon will become the foundation of
the next environmental initiatives: water management, brownfield restoration, and new patterns of U.S. real estate and community development. The business model, market solution, and
strategies for CO2 will set the stage for the next global trading
product—water rights—because of its implications for health,
new power generation, food, and weather impacts on famine,
economic growth, and power production.
Our future course in managing carbon may be unclear, but
the stakes involved in the choice between a new trading system
or the tax system are quite high. After watching market based
responses artificially built around trading and financial risk
management from savings and loans, dot-coms, electric power
marketing, natural gas marketing, agricultural commodities, and
sub-prime mortgage lending, a fresh innovative approach built
around the federal tax system could become a powerful tool of
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market-based action across stationary, mobile, and building emission sources. This true market-based approach also ensures that
physical investment will match with financial risk management
strategies to diminish volatility and achieve the desired result.
Other financial derivatives wrapped around trading schemes do
not provide that comfort, and limit the return and benefits to narrow sectors of society and create distortions in markets.
The consequences of a developed and imposed carbon tax
should be consistently offset against other less desirable business
and individual taxes striving for revenue neutrality. The revenues should never be converted into sources of new funding for
grand social programs or legislative earmarks that benefit political elites, instead of benefiting true markets, U.S. companies,
industries, and the underlying public policy objectives of the
carbon tax operating in a global economy. Carbon can become a
driver for innovation and job creation and technology advancement in the 21st century as opposed to being a mere externality.
Success will depend upon the choices we make managing the
laws of science, economics, and politics with balance and true
protection of U.S. markets and industry. In addressing honestly
the greatest market failure of the 20th century, we can create an
economic renaissance built on sustainable and sound technology
and business practices.
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The Thirsty Rio Grande:
Sustainable Water Planning
Along the Rio Grande in the Age
of Global Warming
by Matthew Padilla*

T

he snow that falls in the Rockies’ Sierra Sangre de Cristo
range holds water during the winter months, slowly
releasing water over the spring and summer months into
the tributaries and aquifers that feed the Rio Grande basin.1 As
the climate continues to warm, the ability of the Rio Grande basin
to replenish itself may become increasingly threatened as snowpack decreases and evaporation rates increase.2 Past droughts
and environmental catastrophes are archeologically preserved in
the ruins of ancient southwestern cities such as Chaco Canyon3
and serve as dire warnings of what may occur in a dryer climate.
As the Southwest prepares for population growth and increased
water scarcity, Albuquerque and El Paso’s stories illustrate how
the destinies of all the communities in the Rio Grande valley are
intertwined.
In the 1980s, New Mexico and the city of El Paso litigated
and negotiated water rights in federal court and before the New
Mexico State Engineer.4 New Mexico’s “beneficial use” provision in its state Constitution and related water management statutes place strict restrictions on water exports.5 Eventually, New
Mexico was not compelled to provide its water to El Paso, thus
allowing farmers and cities in the state to keep part of an already
limited supply of water from booming El Paso.6 As a result, El
Paso was forced to pump more water out of its aquifer in the
Hueco Bolson. El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, which both draw
water from the Hueco Bolson water basin, have been estimated
to have as little as two years of freshwater remaining in their
aquifer and both face population growth.7
El Paso is experiencing increased growth because of military base realignments, which will add nearly 28,000 soldiers,
not to mention their families, to Fort Bliss through 2013.8 With
limited groundwater or water from the Rio Grande to sustain
growth, the city of El Paso turned to the federal government and
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) for federal assistance.9
The solution was the largest inland desalination plant in the
world, meant to treat the remaining brackish ground water and
ensure El Paso’s future growth.10 It is estimated that depleting
the Hueco will enable the city of El Paso to maintain an estimated fifty years of projected growth.11 The Hueco, however, is
not easily recharged and there appear to be no plans for the city
if the Hueco is tapped dry.
* Matthew Padilla is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Washington College of Law.

71

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

